Review of Self-exclusion from Gambling Venues as an Intervention for Problem Gambling by Sally M. Gainsbury
REVIEW PAPER
Review of Self-exclusion from Gambling Venues
as an Intervention for Problem Gambling
Sally M. Gainsbury
Published online: 22 January 2013
 Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013
Abstract Self-exclusion programs are required to be provided by gambling operators in
many international jurisdictions in an attempt to provide an option for those who have
gambling problems to avoid further gambling. However, minimal robust and comprehensive
research has been conducted to evaluate the effectiveness of self-exclusion programs. There
is much scope for reform and greater cohesion between jurisdictions, particularly neigh-
bouring jurisdictions that would offer greater protection to individuals and industry bodies.
This review outlines the evidence surrounding existing self-exclusion strategies, the benefits
and limitations of such programs, and provides potential recommendations for an effective
intervention program. Research suggests that self-exclusion programs are under-utilised by
problem gamblers and are not completely effective in preventing individuals from gambling
in venues from which they have excluded, or on other forms. Nonetheless, self-report indi-
cates that self-excluders generally experience benefits from programs, including decreased
gambling and increased psychological wellbeing and overall functioning. There are many
areas in which existing programs could be improved, such as providing more resources for
excluded individuals and reducing barriers to program entry, and more research is needed.
However, self-exclusion programs are an important component of any public health strategy
that aims to minimise gambling-related harms and these should be based as far as possible on
empirical evidence for effective program components.
Keywords Gambling problems  Pathological gambling  Policy  Effectiveness 
Self-exclusion  Harm minimization
Introduction
The extent to which government bodies regulate consumer behaviour is dictated in part by
the most appropriate balance of individual freedom, personal choice and responsibility, and
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necessary safeguards and protection strategies to minimise potential harm. It is difficult for
outside parties to verify appropriate limits for gambling behaviour in the absence of
regulation and effective policies. In addition, appropriate gambling behaviour is extremely
dependent on personal situations and factors and self-imposed attempts to limit gambling
are often not effective for those who are most likely to exceed appropriate limits and
gamble excessively. Although personal resolutions and willpower can have some use in
controlling and modifying behaviour, there are no penalties for reversing these. This
reduces the capacity for sustained control particularly given that problem gamblers, par-
ticularly electronic gaming machine (EGM) players,1 often experience a loss of control and
are more likely to exceed spending limits when they consume alcohol or are in certain
emotional states, such as feeling bored, lonely, stressed or sad (Productivity Commission
2010).
In most societies internationally, the majority of adults gamble with annual participation
rates ranging from 65 to 82 % (Fong et al. 2011; Petry et al. 2005; Productivity Com-
mission 2010; Wardle et al. 2011; Wood and Williams 2010). Although most people
gamble relatively infrequently and within affordable means, problem and the more severe
pathological gambling are increasingly recognised as significant public health issues with a
prevalence of 1–4 % in the adult population (Fong et al. 2011; Petry et al. 2005; Pro-
ductivity Commission 2010; Wardle et al. 2011; Wood and Williams 2010). Problem
gambling is characterised by difficulties in limiting money and/or time spent on gambling,
leading to adverse consequences for the gambler, or others, such as health and psycho-
logical disorders, bankruptcy, or crime (National Research Council 1999; Neal et al. 2004).
Problem gambling appears to be caused by a complex interaction between individual
factors and a range of social and environmental influences (Blaszczynski and Nower 2002;
Hodgins et al. 2011). Given the inherent risks involved with gambling, there is a continuum
of risk of hard associated with this activity with the nature and severity of experienced
harm being related to the frequency and level of expenditure (Currie et al. 2006, 2012;
Schaffer 2005). Problem gambling is not a chronic condition and evidence from longitu-
dinal studies indicates that people shift between levels of harm over time (Currie et al.
2012; LaPlante et al. 2008; Svensson and Romild 2011). Gamblers who are relatively free
of any symptomatology are referred to as low-risk gamblers, and moderate-risk gamblers
are those experiencing some related difficulties, such as gambling more than they intended,
but without significant impairments to other areas of their lives (Currie et al. 2006, 2012).
Given the difficulties in problem gamblers, by themselves, to effectively gambling
within pre-set limits (Lalande and Ladouceur 2011), there are grounds for governments to
ensure that resources are available to assist players. Although industry bodies may self-
impose the responsibility to provide appropriate harm minimisation interventions, gov-
ernment regulation provides the necessary power to ensure that these are effective,
empower venues to enforce their commitments and impose penalties for industry operators
and individuals who do not comply with agreed strategies.
Self-exclusion is an extreme form of pre-commitment, in which gamblers who believe
that they have a problem can voluntarily bar themselves from entering one or more
gambling venues to prevent them from gambling. Under a formal self-exclusion program,
the individual agrees that the venue and/or government regulators authorise gaming staff to
deny them access to the venue. This agreement places the responsibility on the individual
as they risk removal for breaches and can possibly be charged with trespass. Nominated
1 Electronic gaming machines (EGMs) include machines used across various jurisdictions including video
lottery terminals (VLTs), poker machines (pokies), fruit machines, and slot machines.
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periods of self-exclusion vary from 6 months to irrevocable lifetime bans, and detected
breaches may incur additional penalties beyond simply being removed from venues.
Evolving from informal banning procedures used by casinos to evict problematic or unruly
patrons, self-exclusion programs have become the predominant harm-reduction strategy
used by the gaming industry (Nower and Blaszczynski 2008). Such programs are designed
to limit access to gaming opportunities and provide problem gamblers help to cease or
limit their gambling behaviour (Blaszczynski et al. 2007). Self-exclusion agreements have
historically been industry-driven, but an increasing number of jurisdictions are introducing
legislation requiring the provision of programs of self-exclusion reflecting increasing social
and community concern in regards to problem gambling and the availability of gambling.
Despite the implementation of self-exclusion strategies in numerous international
jurisdictions, minimal research has been conducted to evaluate the effectiveness of self-
exclusion programs. Furthermore, policies differ between jurisdictions making compari-
sons and generalisation of results difficult. Therefore, there is little information to inform
best practice and what elements should be included in programs. However, although the
evidence is not comprehensive, preliminary findings indicate that this type of pre-
commitment arrangement has significant benefits for problem gamblers.
Creating an effective self-exclusion program is a challenge as self-exclusion agreements
currently suffer from various limitations that reduce both the extent to which they can be
enforced and success in preventing individuals from gambling. The deficiencies of self-
exclusion strategies have been recognised and efforts are being taken to implement
changes that offer potential solutions to some of the limitations. There is much scope for
reform and greater cohesion between jurisdictions, particularly neighbouring jurisdictions
that would offer greater protection to individuals and industry bodies. This review will
outline the evidence surrounding existing self-exclusion strategies, the benefits and limi-
tations of such programs and potential recommendations for an effective intervention
program.
Features and Foundation Principles of Self-exclusion Programs
The features and principles of a self-exclusion program should be fully understood by
individuals who wish to self-exclude, employees of gaming venues, gaming venue oper-
ators and regulatory bodies. This is essential in order to clarify expectations regarding the
role and limits of all parties including legal and governmental authorities and avoid
unrealistic expectations and unfair criticisms.
Self-exclusion agreements generally do not constitute a formal contract enforceable by
law (Napolitano 2003). By signing a self-exclusion agreement, individuals typically agree
to certain obligations and forgo some rights under an agreement with an operator that is
offered voluntarily or enforced by law. These include:
• for nominated venues, they agree not to enter gaming areas, not to play gaming
machines or not to enter the venue at all
• authorising staff to stop them from entering or remaining in a gaming area or venue that
they are excluded from
• authorising for photographs and personal details to be taken and disseminated to
relevant venues and for venues to display the photographs
• waiving the right to sue nominated venues, their staff or the program administrator on
the grounds of assault, defamation or failing in a duty of care to exclude
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• accept their personal responsibility to stay away
• acknowledge that nominated venues or their staff have no legal duty implied by the
self-exclusion deed.
Most venues advertise self-exclusion programs on their websites and through pamphlets
and displays in venues. Individuals wishing to self-exclude can usually register at a venue,
sign the agreement and have their photograph taken. They are typically advised that there
is help for problem gambling, receive information about the self-exclusion program and the
nature of the agreement, including their responsibility to uphold it and may be provided
with referral information for further help. Self-exclusion agreements are typically offered
for periods of 6 months, 1–5 years or as lifetime bans.
Venue security personnel typically enforce self-exclusion policies. A breach is recorded
if the person is discovered contravening their agreement. The first time a person is dis-
covered breaching self-exclusion, they are typically asked to leave the venue. In some
jurisdictions, this process involves the attendance of a law enforcement officer or repre-
sentative from the gambling regulator. While rarely used, someone breaching a self-
exclusion agreement can be charged with an offence and/or fined.
Literature Review: The Effectiveness of Current Self-exclusion Programs
This review describes the findings of the relevant studies conducted on self-exclusion
programs available in the published academic and grey literature. It is intended to provide a
comprehensive understanding of the available evidence to date that is relevant to the
establishment and implementation of a self-exclusion program. This review is limited due
to the few comprehensive evaluative studies that have been conducted for self-exclusion
programs. Furthermore, the studies included have methodological limitations that reduce
the extent to which results can be used to improve existing programs or inform new
strategies and older studies have been excluded for lack of relevance. Table 1 outlines the
details of the major studies that have been conducted in regards to self-exclusion programs.
Quebec
Self-exclusion programs are offered in each of the casinos in Quebec and range from
periods of 3 months to 5 years. The program is run by the casino security department and
is publicized in pamphlets available in the casino. To register, the individual is taken to a
private office where they complete and sign a consent form and a photograph is taken. In
the casinos, security agents are trained in the identification of self-excluded individuals and
if a self-excluded individual is identified they will be approached and ask to leave.
The evaluations completed indicate that between 73 and 95 % of self-excluders are
probable pathological gamblers (Ladouceur et al. 2000, 2007). The most popular period of
self-exclusion appears to be 12 months (46–66 %), as compared to 2 years (21–25 %), or
6 months (9–33 %). The majority of participants report that they decided to self-exclude
themselves (74–88 %), although family and friends also appear to play a role in the
decision to self-exclude. Financial problems constituted the main reason for self-exclusion
and the majority reported that they were not able to stop gambling of their own accord.
The self-exclusion program has been shown to be linked to a reduction of pathological
gambling habits and gambling-related problems (Ladouceur et al. 2007), although direct
causality cannot be determined. The levels of reported satisfaction with the program was
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generally high (80 %) amongst participants and the majority (77 %) indicated that they
would use self-exclusion programs again (Ladouceur et al. 2000, 2007). At the beginning of
the program the majority of participants believed that the self-exclusion program would be
effective (62–97 %) in helping them stay away from casinos. However, 70 % of self-
excluders reported gambling in casinos or elsewhere during their ban and 11–55 % of
gamblers broke their contract. Those who returned did so an average of six times. High drop-
out rates amongst participants in the study may mean that these figures underestimate the
proportion of individuals who broke their agreements. Criticism also existed regarding the
self-exclusion program and many gamblers felt that the programs did not provide them with
sufficient resources on problem gambling treatment and support during the ban period, that
the detection process was weak, the program was not well advertised and they should be able
to renew a self-exclusion agreement without going back to the casino (Ladouceur et al. 2000).
A third study was undertaken in Quebec following modifications made to the self-
exclusion program in 2005 (Tremblay et al. 2008). In the new procedure, individuals have
the opportunity to meet with a self-exclusion counsellor at the beginning of the self-
exclusion period. The counsellor is a psychologist, independent from the casino and
located outside the casino. Additionally, telephone support from the counsellor is available
to direct the self-excluder toward appropriate resources during the ban period. Finally, a
counselling meeting is required at the end of the self-exclusion period to evaluate the
situation and provide appropriate information about chance and responsible gambling
before re-entry to the casino is permitted. If individuals refused to attend the mandatory
meetings they are permitted to sign a regular agreement and given an information sheet to
explain the self-exclusion service with an option to contact a counsellor if desired.
Three-quarters (n = 857) of all individuals who signed a self-exclusion agreement
between November 2005 and May 2007 opted for the improved program (Tremblay et al.
2008). Although 40 % of the self-excluders requested an evaluation, only one-third came
to the initial meeting. This represents 15 % of self-excluded gamblers and is slightly higher
than the 10 % of self-excluders in a regular self-exclusion program who report seeing a
counsellor (Ladouceur et al. 2000). Very few (n = 5) participants initiated calls to their
counsellor for support during the self-exclusion program. Although 74 % of participants
reported in their initial meeting that they were very or totally able to resist the impulse to
gamble, 46 % of participants who responded to the follow-up survey reported breaching
their self-exclusion contract. However, the majority of participants (82 %) reported that the
self-exclusion program was ‘very’ or ‘totally’ effective. Analysis of responses at the initial
and final meeting showed that there was a significant reduction in time and money spent
gambling as well as the intensity of negative consequences of gambling. Participants
appeared to have fewer symptoms of pathological gambling as well as fewer symptoms of
depression, anxiety and at-risk alcohol consumption.
These studies include small, non-representative samples of gamblers who have entered
self-exclusion agreements in Quebec and as such the results are limited in the extent to
which conclusions can be extrapolated. However, the general findings indicate that
although self-exclusion programs are not highly effective in preventing individuals from
gambling, they do appear to be associated with a reduction in gambling behaviour and
problem gambling severity.
Nova Scotia
An evaluation of a trial of a self-exclusion program implemented in 45 EGM retail sites in
Nova Scotia in 2004 was conducted with gaming venue employees, regular EGM players,
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and confederate players to test the detection and enforcement policies (Schrans et al. 2004).
The study did not examine the impacts of the self-exclusion program on problem gamblers,
but tested the compliance of gaming venue employees. It was tested in a limited area
comprised of rural and small urban communities so it is not possible to extrapolate how the
program would impact large urban communities. As it only included a small number of
venues and 36 ‘‘self-excluded’’ player participants it is also much smaller than any actual
self-exclusion program. The actual program implemented is not described in detail, but
appears to involve a centralised self-exclusion database with photographs and participant
information circulated to all participating venues. Gaming venue employees were
responsible for identifying self-excluded players and filing reports.
The evaluation (Schrans et al. 2004) found that following program implementation
venue identification rates and compliance with program protocols declined significantly.
After only 3 months identification rates fell to one-third of detection rates at the start of the
trial and breach submission reports dropped by about half. The overall identification rate
for play sessions by program participants was 23 %, meaning that 77 % of play visits were
not detected and/or correctly reported upon. This is in spite of monthly formal training
sessions and notification packages sent to venues. More concerning was the poor detection
rate, even with only 28 players on the ‘‘excluded’’ list in the 1st month. Only one in every
three play visits was being detected for regular players and one in ten for unfamiliar
players. Furthermore, only 42 % of reports filed were accurate in identifying a ‘‘true
positive’’ play visit demonstrating high levels of mistakenly identifying player breaches
and unnecessary paperwork. Also concerning was the finding that one-third of local players
taking part in the study encountered some issues with breaches in confidentiality. Most of
these were not malicious or deliberate disclosure but rather unintentional or careless
breaches. The report concluded that the process test found that the retail monitoring
component of the program proposed for multi-site EGMs was not sufficient to support the
programs objectives or expectations. The results indicated that it was not appropriate or
reasonable to rely on gaming venue employees to subjectively detect and accurately report
on self-excluded players. Finally, the authors concluded that changes identified to improve
the program are likely to be too cumbersome, expensive and impractical to be implemented
and, moreover, are unlikely to assure the required improvements in venue performance.
Canada
A review of the use of self-exclusion programs for casinos in Canada was conducted by
Williams et al. (2007). This review estimated that, based on self-exclusion data from 2005
for the seven Canadian provinces with casinos, between 0.6 and 7.0 % of problem gam-
blers signed up to self-exclude. These fairly low utilisation rates suggest that programs
need to be promoted more effectively and potentially modified to make them more
attractive as a suitable strategy to control gambling for problem gamblers.
A telephone interview was conducted with 300 randomly selected self-excluded indi-
viduals from seven Canadian provinces to evaluate the effectiveness of self-exclusion
programs (Verlik 2008). The majority (49 %) were 35–54 years old, participants were
most likely to be male (58 %), employed full-time (68 %), and play EGMs (57 %). The
majority of participants (68 %) appeared to be high-risk problem gamblers and 17 % were
at moderate risk, although only one-third had ever sought formal help for their gambling
problems. Participants reported finding information about the program through family or
friends (42 %), staff at gaming venues (24 %) or posters, pamphlets and brochures (20 %).
When asked about the factors that were important in their decision to enter the program,
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the majority of participants endorsed the desire to stop gambling altogether as being
extremely or very important (81 %) and the threat of personal consequences (70 %) and
other people (65 %) were also viewed as very important factors.
Most participants were happy with the information provided about the self-exclusion
program. Participants rated casino staff (74 %), the Alberta Gaming and Liquor Com-
mission website (84 %), and printed information (73 %) as very or somewhat effective in
providing them with information (Verlik 2008). However, there was a clear demonstration
of the need for more staff training as only 69 % of self-excluders rated staff who enrolled
them in the program as being very or somewhat effective in explaining the program and the
responsibilities of each party. Similarly, only 68 % of participants rated the program’s
current enrolment and registration process as very or somewhat effective indicating room
for modifications and improvements. Of those who felt that the enrolment periods were
ineffective, 41 % stated that they would have liked to have the option of a lifetime ban
indicating the importance of having options for time frames of self-exclusion periods.
Although most participants appeared to be satisfied with the level of information they were
provided with, only 48 % felt that they were completely or very informed about the
penalties for breaking the program agreement. Participants were mostly (51 %) satisfied
with the severity of penalties and did not agree with an option to remove self-exclusion
bans before the time period had expired (72 %). Overall 67 % of respondents rated the
overall effectiveness of self-exclusion programs as somewhat or very effective.
Just over half of the self-excluded participants in Canada admitted to breaching their
agreement, and those that breached did so frequently (Verlik 2008). Of participants that
breached their agreement, only 48 % were recognised and 81 % stated that it was very easy
to gain entry to excluded venues. At least 50 % of participants currently enrolled in self-
exclusion programs stated that they planned to re-enrol in the program, with 74 % planning
to re-enrol for three years. The majority of participants (68 %) stated that facial recognition
technology and mandatory identification checks would be very effective, as would man-
datory identification checks for jackpots with winnings forfeited (61 %) and more infor-
mation being provided about problem gambling services (51 %). The options of lifetime
enrolment (47 %), a mandatory re-entry program (45 %), and third party initiation (30 %)
were not endorsed by as many self-excluded participants and 30 % of participants also
viewed third party initiation of self-exclusion program to be somewhat or very ineffective.
Focus groups were conducted with 76 individuals with self-exclusion program expe-
rience across seven Canadian provinces (Responsible Gambling Council 2008). This
sample was not intended to be representative of all Canadian self-excluders and as such
results must be interpreted with caution. Participants reported that following self-exclusion
their gambling behaviour reduced in terms of number of sessions, and time and money
spent gambling. One-third reported breaching their self-exclusion agreements; among
these 70 % were not detected and of those who were detected 63 % went on to breach
again suggesting that being detected was not a deterrent for the majority of participants.
The majority of participants (59 %) reported that they had engaged in other forms of
gambling, not covered by their self-exclusion agreements, during their bans. Of the focus
group participants, only 30 % reported abstaining from all gambling activities during their
ban.
Results of the focus groups indicated that self-exclusion programs are an important tool
for patrons dealing with gambling problems (Responsible Gambling Council 2008). Many
participants reported that self-exclusion agreements played a significant role in helping
them to stop gambling and how good it felt to be in control of their gambling. Even those
who were not successful in quitting entirely reported reductions in amounts of time and
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money spent and the frequency of gambling after they had self-excluded. The participants
reported that staff should be better trained and self-exclusion should be dealt with in a more
compassionate and supportive manner with resources and options provided for self-
excluders to assist in controlling gambling. Although there was mixed support for the use
of player cards or identification checks when entering venues, there was a consensus that
bans need to be better enforced. Participants acknowledged their individual responsibility
with regards to self-exclusion, but stated that bans need to be taken more seriously by
venues and consequences for breaching bans are not severe enough. Participants reported
that bans should be used in more venues, including EGM sites, not just casinos and they
should be promoted more widely. There was general scepticism in the extent to which
gaming venues wanted to have robust self-exclusion programs because these might neg-
atively affect their business and participants felt that a third party should regulate any
program, including penalizing venues that do not comply.
Missouri
The Missouri Gaming Commission has provided researchers access to the censored roster of
enrolees in the Missouri Voluntary Exclusion Program (MVEP) to investigate the long-term
effectiveness of the program in helping participants change their gambling behaviour. The
MVEP was created in 1996 as the first state-wide self-exclusion program in the US. Partic-
ipants volunteered to ban themselves for life and assumed responsibility for not entering any
Missouri casino. The Missouri Gaming Commission ensures that all participants’ names are
removed from marketing lists that self-excluded individuals are prohibited from cashing
cheques in casinos and requires identification before compensating any jackpot winner of
$1,200 or more. If self-excluded individuals are caught entering a casino they may be arrested
and charged with trespassing (Missouri Gaming Commission 2008).
Nower and Blaszczynski (2006) examined the characteristics of gamblers enrolled in the
MVEP between 2001 and 2003 and analysed the data based on gender differences. The gender
ratio for self-excluded gamblers was found to be approximately equal and a high percentage
of both genders endorsed EGM play. Female self-excluders were more likely than males to be
older at the time of application, African American, and either retired, unemployed or
otherwise outside the traditional workforce. In addition, female self-excluders were more
likely to report a later age of gambling onset, a shorter period between onset and self-
exclusion, a preference for non-strategic games and prior bankruptcy.
A subsequent analysis of a subset of individuals enrolled in the MVEP between 2001
and 2003 and analysed the data based on age (Nower and Blaszczynski 2008). Compared
to younger or middle-aged adults, older adults were more likely to have gambled longer
before self-exclusion, to be married and/or retired or unemployed, and to express a strong
preference for nonstrategic forms of gambling. In addition they were nearly four times as
likely to self-exclude in an effort to prevent suicide. The authors concluded that older
gamblers represent a distinct subgroup of problem gamblers whose gambling behaviour is
likely tied to situational factors that prompt initiation and rapid escalation of gambling.
Reasons for registering for self-exclusion across all groups included gaining control,
needing help, and hitting rock bottom (Nower and Blaszczynski 2006, 2008). The findings of
these studies are quite preliminary and are limited by the lack of valid screening instruments,
use of categorical variables and extent to which results can be extrapolated to other juris-
dictions given the lifetime condition of the ban, which is not the typical exclusion period.
In 2007 researchers attempted to contact a randomised, representative sample of par-
ticipants in the MVEP to conduct a telephone survey (Nelson et al. 2010). This represents
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one of the first long-term follow-up studies of a self-exclusion program. The time between
MVEP enrolment and follow-up interview ranged from 3.8 to 10.5 years with an average
of 6.1 years (SD = 1.6). After entering the program 25 % of participants reported quitting
all gambling, 18 % reported quitting casino gambling and the remainder (58 %) reported
not quitting any gambling. Of those surveyed only 13 % had not gambled at all since
enrolling in MVEP. Among those who reported quitting all types of gambling, 46 %
gambled at some point after MVEP enrolment. Over half (60 %) of participants surveyed
gambled in the 6 months prior to the interview with lowest recent participation amongst
those who attempted to quit all forms of gambling. Prior to entering the MVEP 97 % of
participants gambled in Missouri casinos and after self-exclusion only 8 % reported
gambling in Missouri casinos, although 74 % went to casinos in other jurisdictions. Fol-
lowing enrolment, 16 % of participants attempted to enter Missouri casinos an average of
4.7 times, of these, only 50 % were caught indicating a lack of strict policy enforcement.
The majority (81 %) of participants who continued to gamble regularly after enrolling
reported gambling less than before and none reported gambling more.
When asked what promoted enrolment in the MVEP, 23 % of participants had stated
that others had influenced them, including supportive, coercive and contagion influences
(Nelson et al. 2010). The majority (77 %) provided self-related reasons, most commonly
financial worries as well as an inability to control gambling and recognition of having a
problem. Most participants (68 %) expressed satisfaction with the program, however
nearly one-third expressed dissatisfaction including complaints regarding the permanence
of the ban and inadequate explanations at registration. Overall participant’s gambling
severity scores decreased significantly following MVEP enrolment, although this was
reported retrospectively, and there was slight reported improvement in quality of life.
Almost 60 % of participants reported receiving some form of treatment or self-help and
participants were more likely to report involvement in therapy after enrolment (34 %) than
before (15 %). Treatment and self-help involvement was significantly related to post-
MVEP quality of life as well as gambling abstinence.
Australia
It is estimated that there are around 15,000 self-exclusion agreements in force in Australia
(Productivity Commission 2010). This suggests that between 9 and 17 % of problem
gamblers in Australia are currently self-excluded (Productivity Commission 2010). State
gambling prevalence surveys have reported that 31–61 % of problem gamblers surveyed
have attempted to self-exclude (AC Nielson 2007; Queensland Government 2006, 2007;
South Australian Department of Health 2006). However, these surveys are often limited by
the small, non-representative samples included and methodological issues that may
overestimate the number of self-exclusion agreements (e.g., by asking individuals about
their attempt to self-exclude as opposed to actual self-exclusion agreements entered into).
A survey of problem gamblers undergoing counselling found that 39 % of problem
gamblers had self-excluded from gaming venues (Productivity Commission 2010). How-
ever, treatment-seeking gamblers are more likely to enter (or be required to enter) self-
exclusion agreements than problem gamblers who do not seek formal treatment. In a
review of evidence available the Productivity Commission (2010) concluded that
approximately 10–30 % of problem gamblers have current self-exclusion agreements in
place, which is higher than figures reported from Canada by Williams et al. (2007).
A pilot study of 135 self-excluded gamblers was conducted in New South Wales,
Australia between 2003 and 2005 (Croucher et al. 2006). This survey revealed that 79 % of
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male and 80 % of female participants gambled on EGMs while on a self-exclusion
agreement and 45 % of male and 33 % of female participants gambled at a venue from
which they were specifically excluded. Those who breached their agreements typically did
so on at least 10 occasions. On 56 % of occasions self-excluded men were identified by
venue staff and 71 % of women were identified. About one in three broke their contract
within a month of the agreement, and of those who breached contracts this was usually
between one and 6 months after signing the agreement. The majority (75 %) started
gambling within 6 months of signing the agreement.
Although the program appears to have limited effectiveness in stopping participants
from gambling, the overwhelming majority of participants strongly supported the program
(Croucher et al. 2006). Participants stated that the program had been very helpful in
regaining control of their financial affairs and overcoming relationship problems. Fur-
thermore, many participants found the process of enrolling into the program empowering
and saw it as the start of their recovery, which may be related to the skill of the counsellor
at their initial interview. Finally, about 70 % of participants more than halved the amount
they spent on gambling, indicating that the program had a positive impact on gambling
expenditure.
A large-scale, multi-phase study of the motivators and barriers for help-seeking among
gamblers was completed by the Centre for Gambling Education & Research (Hing et al.
2011). Analyses were conducted of responses from a combined sample of regular gamblers
recruited via a national telephone survey and in culturally-diverse gambling venues,
gamblers calling a telephone helpline and an online survey of problem gamblers in
treatment. In the combined sample (N = 730), there were 153 non-problem gamblers, 82
low risk gamblers, 117 moderate risk gamblers and 346 problem gamblers (32 missing
cases). Awareness of professional sources of help was very low, only 31 % of participants
were aware of venue assistance, including self-exclusion programs, which was the second
most known source of help, behind telephone counselling. Awareness of self-exclusion
was highest among problem gamblers (36 %) and low risk gamblers (35 %), as compared
to moderate risk gamblers (25 %) and non-problem gamblers (25 %). Younger gamblers
(18–39) were more aware (37.5 %) that venues can offer assistance for a gambling
problem than were older gamblers (28.2 %). When asked about factors that would moti-
vate them to seek help for gambling problems, ‘‘concerns from the venue where you were
gambling’’ was rated as the least important factor by the overall sample and among
problem gamblers.
A study of self-excluders in Victoria was conducted to further the understanding of
motivators and barriers to self-exclusion specific to hotels and clubs (Abbott et al. 2011).
Interviews were conducted with 60 self-excluders (66 % female, mean age = 53 years,
age range 28–86) who on average had 3 years’ experience with self-exclusion (ran-
ge = 0–10 years). Almost half of the participants (45.5 %) stated that it took them less
than a month to self-exclude after finding out about the program. A further 15 % joined
within 4–6 weeks, 9 % within 3 months, 7 % waited 6 months and 7 % waited a year
before commencing self-exclusion. The majority of participants (73 %) stated that they felt
very comfortable or enthusiastic about joining the program, and a further 20 % stated they
felt reasonably comfortable or enthusiastic about this. It is possible that the retrospective
nature of these accounts has moderated these responses given that anecdotal evidence
indicates that many individuals are relatively distressed and anxious during the initiation
process and research confirms that this option is often a final resort based on a crisis
situation. Therefore, these responses are more likely to be an indicator of current levels of
comfort and enthusiasm about the program.
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Of the 24 motivators discussed, all were endorsed as being reasonably important by the
majority of the participants (78 %). Responses are consistent with previous research and
indicate that motivating factors include: emotional distress, financial crisis, a loss of
control, and embarrassment related to being asked to leave. The least important factors,
still rated on average as ‘a lot’ important included the immediacy of exclusion compared to
counselling, physical health concerns, and approval from family members. Men were more
likely to endorse the lack of time commitment, compared to counselling, as being
important than women.
The most significant barriers to joining a self-exclusion program appeared to be
admitting to oneself that they had lost control and needed external assistance to stop
gambling. The majority of participants (85 %) also indicated that the fact that they did not
want to stop gambling was reasonably important and 92 % indicated that they did not
know what they would do with their spare time if they were not gambling and that they did
not want others to find out about their gambling.
This research had a small sample that was self-selected and may not be representative of
all self-excluders. The questions were somewhat awkwardly worded and many of the
factors provided as motivators and barriers concentrated on a relatively small number of
factors. Nonetheless, the research confirms previous studies that indicate emotional and
financial distress and related feelings of being out of control are important motivating
factors to join self-exclusion programs. The most important barriers to joining a self-
exclusion program appear to be related to a desire to address gambling-related problems
unaided and difficulty admitting that one has a gambling problem and needs assistance.
Subsequently, efforts are needed to reduce the stigma related to problem gambling and
awareness that it is a relatively common problem that does not imply a personal deficit. For
example, campaigns can work to put a different face on problem gamblers by depicting a
wide range of individuals who have gambling problems (to get away from the stereotypes)
and the courage and strength it takes to admit to needing help. Addressing the shame and
embarrassment related to admitting to needing help is essential to increase participation in
self-exclusion programs.
New Zealand
In New Zealand, problem gambling is encompassed in a public health approach and self-
exclusion is legislated by the Gambling Act 2003, which takes a product safety approach
(Townshend 2007). An individual can exclude themselves at a gaming venue or by mail
and agreements can last for any nominated period up to 2 years and only apply to the
gambling area of the venue. If a self-excluded gambler breaches a ban they commit an
offence and can be fined up to $500, the venue that allows them to gamble also commits an
offence and can be fined up to $10,000 and may not be able to renew their gambling
licence. The strict consequences of breaches have made gaming operators very wary of
allowing self-excluded gamblers into their venues (Townshend 2007). Gambling Harm
Prevention and Minimisation regulations (2004) require all venues to have staff trained in
harm minimisation strategies on duty at all times. Both the consequences of breaches and
staff training are expected to have contributed to the effectiveness of self-exclusion with
593 self-exclusions casino casinos between 2004 and 2005 with only 188 exclusions
initiated by the casinos (Department of Internal Affairs 2006).
Townshend (2007) conducted a small follow-up survey of 35 self-excluders from a
single community problem gambling treatment survey. The majority (60 %) were male, all
played EGMs primarily, 29 % had co-morbid substance use disorders and 20 % had other
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mental health disorders. A comparison of the information gathered and assessment and the
follow-up survey found that there was a significant reduction in problem gambling
symptoms and severity as well as money lost. Participants also reported greater control
over their gambling and approximately 80 % stated they were abstinent from gambling,
although two participants stated that their gambling remained unchanged. This was a small
scale study of a non-representative sample and it is not possible to determine the impact of
self-exclusion agreements separate from the effects of treatment. Furthermore, the par-
ticipants had initiated self-exclusion agreements with the help of the service. However, it
supports the use of self-exclusion agreements in combination with treatment for problem
gambling.
Europe
Self-exclusion programs appear to be more effectively in European countries than in North
American and Australia. In many European jurisdictions, individuals are required to show
personal identification before entering a casino. For example, at casinos operated by
Holland Casino, a computer system registers all visits and immediately identifies anyone
who has requested a ban or visit limitation (De Bruin et al. 2001). The Netherlands also
appears to have relatively high self-exclusion program utilisation rates with an estimated
25,000 agreements arranged between 1990 and 2002 (Nowatzki and Williams 2002).
Amongst a random sample of 50 problem gamblers, 40 % had been reached by Holland
Casino’s prevention policy by either asking for a protective measure or being approached
by Holland Casino about their gambling behaviour (De Bruin et al. 2001). Furthermore,
awareness rates of visit limitation and self-exclusion policies appear to be relatively high
(above 75 %) in the Netherlands amongst casino visitors and problem gamblers. However,
even with this system a large proportion of self-excluded individuals eventually returned to
the casino following the period of restriction. Of these some had a sharp increase in visiting
frequencies in the following 6 months, although the majority of individuals eventually
stabilised their visiting frequency at less than eight visits per month. Additionally, about
half of self-excluded patrons reportedly found alternative ways to gamble during their self-
excluded period such as illegal gambling or EGMs outside of casinos (De Bruin et al.
2001). It is important to note that these statistics are over 10 years old and it is uncertain
whether the existing program has a similar impact.
In a study of 450 regular gamblers (De Bruin et al. 2006), 83 % of the Holland Casino
problem gamblers who were interviewed were aware of the entry limitations and visitation
bans, 13 % had a form of entry limitation (two-thirds of this group were satisfied with this
measure and 50 % had gambled elsewhere when the casino ban was in place). Of those
problem gamblers that used amusement arcades, 59 % were aware of the exclusion lists,
and 20 % had been placed on these lists at some point (80 % were satisfied with this
measure and 75 % had gambled elsewhere during the ban).
The majority of participants who restricted their play went to gamble at another location
during the restricted period. Slot machine gamblers from the casinos typically gambled in
an amusement arcade, but also went to other establishments or gambled abroad. None of
the banned arcade gamblers entered Holland Casino during their bans. Casino gamblers
often started gambling aboard or in an illegal casino (Goudriaan et al. 2009). A more recent
study would likely find that a substantial proportion of banned or restricted gamblers may
gamble at online sites when they are restricted from gambling venues. Although the
majority of respondents were satisfied with the restriction programs, a large proportion
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indicated that the effectiveness would be increased if the measures applied to both casinos
and arcades.
A similar detection system operates in Switzerland, entry is controlled and visitors are
required to show a passport or identification card and all self-excluded individuals are
registered in an electronic database (Haefeli 2005). In 2004 there were 3,396 bans in
existence and 326 self-exclusion bans that had been lifted, which represented one gambling
ban per 1,425 visitor entries. The majority of self-excluders were men (80 %) and EGM
gamblers (54 %), and were most likely to be aged 31–40 (35 %), although one quarter
were aged 18–30 and over one-fifth (22 %) were aged 41–50 (Haefeli 2008). Only 44 % of
bans were for Swiss gamblers as the majority of self-excluded players were of other
nationalities. The 19 casinos are all networked so gambling bans are applied throughout
Switzerland and are monitored by a regulator. However, it is not known whether self-
excluded players gamble in other countries or venues that are often very close to the Swiss
border, or participate in other forms of gambling.
An evaluation of self-exclusion programs in Europe gathered data from casinos in
Austria, Germany, Switzerland and two Internet gambling sites (Hayer and Meyer 2011a,
b). Participants were given a survey and up to three follow-up questionnaires and one
interview. The casino sample included 152 people, the majority (72 %) of which were males
(mean age 41.3), primarily played EGMs (49 %) and met criteria for pathological gambling
(51 %) (Hayer and Meyer 2011a). Almost one-quarter (24 %) meeting criteria for problem
gambling and one-quarter were non-problem gamblers. Participants appears to have a rel-
atively long period of consideration prior to deciding to self-exclude although they reported
that being able to stop gambling was very important and on average were relatively con-
fident that they were able to succeed. The most common reason given for self-exclusion was
having lost too much money (76 %) and the agreement was also deemed important as a
preventive measure (60 %) and due to a loss of control (53 %). One-fifth of the participants
reported seeking some form of help (including self-help and debt advice) in the past,
although 45 % reported that they intended to do so in the future. These numbers may be
inflated by multiple forms of help seeking indicated by a single respondent.
At 1, 6 and 12-month follow-up, the number of respondents markedly declined reducing
the extent to which conclusions can be drawn from the results (Hayer and Meyer 2011a).
However, the numbers of pathological gamblers markedly declined and fewer respondents
reported being problem gamblers with a corresponding increase in the number of non-
problem gamblers in the sample. At one and 6-month follow-ups the majority of partici-
pants reported gambling less often and for shorter periods of time with lower stakes since
exclusion. At the 12-month follow-up there appeared to be some rebound with approxi-
mately one-third of participants reporting no change in their gambling behaviour and up to
one-quarter reporting increased gambling in the past 6 months. Participants appeared to
experience a reduction in their urges to gamble, emotional stress and loss in quality of life
across time periods. Feelings of control over gambling appeared to increase at 1 and
6 month follow-ups, but declined to almost the same level as at exclusion after 12 months.
The sample gathered from European-based Internet gambling sites (N = 259) was still
primarily male (69 %), slightly younger (mean age 36.2) than the casino participants and
included more problem gamblers (68 %) and non-problem gamblers (32 %) with no
pathological gamblers (Hayer and Meyer 2011b). The decision to self-exclude appeared to
be rather spontaneous with a short period of consideration and being able to stop gambling
immediately was still relatively important, but to a lesser extent than for the casino sample.
The reported confidence in being able to succeed with self-exclusion was similar to that
reported by the casino sample. Participants indicated that they had self-excluded as a
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preventive measure (63 %), as they had lost too much money (52 %) and spent too much
time on the site (36 %).
Similarly to the casino sample, the number of participants markedly declined at each
time period for the Internet sample, with only nine participants reporting at the 12-month
follow-up, again reducing the generalisability of results (Hayer and Meyer 2011b). Sig-
nificantly fewer participants appeared to be problem gamblers at each time-period and
approximately three-quarters of each sample reported gambling less frequently and two-
thirds gambled with lower stake sizes across time periods. At one and 6 months after self-
exclusion over half of the participants reported spending less time gambling, and after
12-months, two-thirds reported no change in the past 6 months, indicating they had
remained at shorter gambling periods since self-exclusion.
The authors concluded that individuals mostly make use of self-exclusion programs
when negative gambling-related consequences are already evident (Hayer and Meyer
2011a, b). The proportion of pathological gamblers in both samples was lower than that
found in samples of self-excluders in Canada (e.g., Ladouceur et al. 2000), but the level of
help seeking behaviour appeared similar as to that found in other countries. Similarly to
results from other studies, self-exclusion appears to have at least a short-term positive
effect on gambling behaviour, problem gambling severity and psycho-social functioning,
however the benefits may decline over time. The conclusions are limited by the small, non-
representative sample that declined over the length of the study, again reinforcing the
importance of comprehensive evaluative studies.
Discussion
The assessments of self-exclusion programs internationally generally find that the majority
of participants benefit from such schemes. These benefits include participants reporting
decreases in gambling expenditure and improved financial circumstances; decreases in
gambling frequency and time spent gambling; reduction in problem gambling severity and
negative consequences of gambling; reduction in related psychological difficulties
including depression and anxiety; and that they feel they have more control of their
circumstances. Even without enforcement, self-exclusions may be somewhat effective
because they allow problem gamblers to make a public commitment to stop gambling.
Some problem gamblers will wish to avoid the potential embarrassment of being caught in
a break of a self-exclusion agreement.
Although there is some evidence of the positive impacts associated with self-exclusion
programs, there is little to indicate the magnitude of the causal link. A gambler’s will-
ingness to address their adverse gambling behaviours precedes self-exclusion in most
cases. It is likely that this willingness, as well as the self-exclusion and potential referrals,
results in better outcomes for the problem gambler.
Although patrons in self-exclusion programs have reported positive benefits, the current
programs are in need of improvements to improve utilisation rates and outcomes over time.
Current programs have been criticised and it has been argued that the industry have offered
marginal support for programs, which thereby are falling short of individual and com-
munity hopes for effectiveness (O’Neil et al. 2003; Nowatzki and Williams 2002).
A key deficit in current self-exclusion programs is that the majority of problem gam-
blers do not enter into these agreements. There is a clear need to reduce some barriers to
self-exclusion, such as limiting embarrassment in instigating process, which can be
heightened in smaller rural communities where privacy is difficult to maintain. Similarly, it
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is important to remove any unnecessary complexities in the application and registration
process, including for those who have limited proficiencies in English and unnecessary
legal jargon. Individuals should be able to exclude from multiple venues in one step and
have the ability to enacted agreements away from gaming venues, such as at a central
administrative office, with a health or mental health treatment provider or legal profes-
sional, or via the Internet or mail.
Self-exclusion programs are partially dependent upon the ability of gaming operators to
accurately identify program participants in order to detect and report violations of the self-
exclusion agreement. The studies completed thus far indicate that the principal points at
which self-exclusion programs are breaking down are the point of detection and the point
of enforcement of expectations as expressed in the act of self-exclusion (Croucher and
Croucher 2006). Identifying self-excluded patrons from photographic information is highly
problematic from the venue’s perspective and the problem of detection is compounded
with growth and expansion of programs. Evaluation of self-exclusion programs including
self-excluded patrons self-report indicates that it is common for breaches to occur and to go
undetected. There are few systematic procedures in place to counter this.
A system program that is not capable of enforcing self-exclusion runs counter to the
expectations of self-excluded patrons, counsellors, the media and community as well as
venue staff, gaming operators and regulators. A failure to detect self-excluders who breach
their agreement seriously undermines the program and may reduce the number of problem
gamblers who register and the effectiveness for those who do register. Self-exclusion
programs are limited in the extent to which they fail to cover gambling available at venues
not included in the agreement. Studies have found that self-excluded individuals engage in
gambling at venues they have not excluded from and in other forms of gambling to which
bans do not apply. Some jurisdictions have introduced self-exclusion agreements that cover
multiple gambling venues and multiple forms of gambling including EGMs, casino games
and Internet gambling.
Recommended Elements of Self-exclusion
Based on the available evidence, the following elements are recommended to be included
in all self-exclusion programs:
• Clear information about self-exclusion programs and promotion of programs to
increase utilisation. Promotion should include venue-based strategies as well as
information provided in the general community and through health and mental health
centres, legal offices, and other relevant support services. Relevant professional should
all be informed about the program so that they may refer clients as appropriate.
• To maximise the uptake of self-exclusion agreements, individuals should be able to
enact self-exclusion agreements directly at gaming venues and also when off-site. The
registration process should be conducted in a respectful manner, in a private setting and
should be relatively quick and easy. If registration is perceived to be too difficult or
complex, this may act as a barrier to self-exclusion. Self-exclusion agreements should
be able to be enacted with treatment providers, counsellors or other suitable health and
legal professionals. Self-exclusion agreements may also be initiated by individuals
using Internet-based protocols that include webcams for photograph identification, by
visiting suitable government agencies or mailing in applications and photographs.
J Gambl Stud (2014) 30:229–251 247
123
• Programs must offer a range of time periods for exclusion. There is a lack of empirical
evidence to suggest what length of ban is most effective in assisting individuals to
control their gambling. Although longer bans may be more effective in providing
individuals with the time needed to overcome their gambling-related problems, these
may deter some individuals from registering for programs. It is suggested that self-
exclusion agreements be a minimum of 6 months to allow individuals sufficient time to
enter treatment if desired or deal with their gambling problems.
• Operators must remove all self-excluded persons from the mailing list and stop offering
incentives during the period of self-exclusion. Individuals must not be reinstated on any
mailing lists even after their self-exclusion period has expired unless they have
specifically applied and been approved to re-enter the venue.
• Resources must be provided to assist self-excluded persons take further steps to control
their gambling including appropriate information and education resources as well as
referrals to formal counselling, treatment or self-help programs. Not all people seeking
self-exclusion want or are receptive to professional help (Ladouceur et al. 2000, 2007;
Tremblay et al. 2008). Hence, mandatory counselling may not be effective and may
deter some individuals from entering into self-exclusion agreements. Internet-based
treatment and self-help interventions may be particularly useful for those who would
benefit from formal help, but are unwilling or unable to attend in-person sessions
(Gainsbury and Blaszczynski 2011a, b).
• Operators must take active steps to identify and remove self-excluded persons who
return to gaming facilities. It is reasonable to require that all patrons must show
appropriate identification before they are admitted to gaming venues to prevent
breaches. This would enable computerised identification checks for enforcement of
self-exclusion. Checking identification has become part of standard practices for many
businesses (e.g., buying alcohol, boarding planes), is accounted for in customer and
queue management and is accepted by consumers.
• A reinstatement process should occur before the self-excluded individual is permitted
re-entry into gaming facilities. When the finishing date of their ban is approaching,
self-excluded individuals should be contacted with appropriate information and details
should be provided of what is required to reinstate entry. A re-entry session may be
held and run by an external organisation to avoid self-excluders having to visit gaming
venues. Alternatively, individuals should be able to extend their ban for a renewed time
period and have a new photograph taken to ensure that it is current. Again, this process
should be provided away from gaming venues to avoid triggering gambling behaviour
and referrals should be provided for treatment services.
• Operators must have an effective training program for all staff who have a role in
enforcing the self-exclusion program, including refresher training. The training
program should include how to identify individuals who may have a gambling
problem and how to adhere to all components of the self-exclusion program.
• Self-exclusion programs should be monitored and evaluated to ensure programs are
effective, have no unintended harmful consequences and are conducted in compliance
with the required processes. The limitations of the current literature and few evaluative
studies conducted highlight the need to develop a systematic process for the evaluation
of self-exclusion programs. A transparent system of monitoring and auditing a self-
exclusion program would reduce any perceived conflict of interest by operators and
clearly demonstrating a programs’ effectiveness may increase utilisation.
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Conclusions
Self-exclusion programs are an essential part of any harm-minimisation strategy offered by
a gaming operator or jurisdictional regulator. Although self-exclusion programs have been
in use since 1996, there are remarkably few comprehensive evaluative studies that have
investigated the impact of these programs and the elements that should be included to
maximise benefits. Despite the severe limitations to the available literature, there is some
evidence that self-exclusion programs generally provide benefits to problem gamblers in
terms of reduced gambling behaviour and reduction of problem gambling severity. There is
also evidence of improved psychological functioning and perceptions of control over
gambling behaviour. However, existing self-exclusion programs are under-utilised and do
not appear to be effective in preventing gamblers from breaching agreements or gambling
on non-restricted activities.
Regulation mandating operators to offer a self-exclusion program to patrons is expected
to enhance the strength of this program by increasing the power to penalise individuals and
operators who do not comply with the standards mandated or breach agreements. This may
increase the effectiveness of programs as well as the perception of such strategies, which
may in turn increase utilisation rates. Although there is no ‘gold standard’ program that can
be implemented, it is important for any regulator to consider the existing evidence and
make every attempt to implement minimum standards that are sufficient to ensure a pro-
grams feasibility. Self-exclusion programs should be flexible to accommodate the needs of
individual gamblers, but must be recognised as a severe form of pre-commitment intended
for those who are unable to control their own gambling behaviour. As such it must be
sufficiently powerful to uphold self-exclusion agreements to the highest standard that can
be reasonably expected in order to offer the maximum benefits and protection for indi-
vidual self-excluded gamblers. It is expected that such programs would require constant
evaluation, monitoring and modification as necessary and in line with developing tech-
nological capabilities. Further research is needed to develop more effective self-exclusion
programs and also to consider tailored programs that are more relevant to individuals, for
example, based on gender, age and cultural differences. Any jurisdiction that allows the
provision of gambling should consider self-exclusion programs carefully in order to pro-
vide a duty of care to gamblers.
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